Order Through Strength: Strategic Imbalance in the Indo-Pacific

6/30 - Geopolitical Analysis Piece

For the first time since the end of the Cold War, America faces a rival that matches and surpasses it in many of the most important strategic industries vital for great power success. China has embarked on the biggest military build up in modern peacetime history, which has resulted in strategic parity via the United States and its Asian allies in the Indo Pacific. A balance of power in the Indo-Pacific where China is approaching strategic parity with the US in several key areas will not produce an equilibrium of stability— which for decades scholars and statesmen have strategized would produce a stabilizing force. A true “balance of power” throughout history and between rival nations often leads to disagreements regarding relative power, which states are more likely to do when they are closely matched. Those disagreements regarding relative power usually end up as a prelude to war, with war acting as the measurement in determining which side is more powerful. Instead, periods of peace throughout the last 200 years have resulted from an imbalance of power where the status quo powers wanting to maintain the system had a disproportionate amount of power relative to the revisionist power trying to revise or remake the system for its own interests. The peace has held in the Indo-Pacific for so long due to the fact that China was weak militarily, while the US and its allies enjoyed disproportionate strength in the Western Pacific, resulting in an imbalance of power, where China could not change the system through strength without facing devastating consequences.

The imbalance of power framework favoring the status quo coalition has led to periods of peace throughout the last 200 years, and American strategists need to look no further than the Congress of Vienna to understand how the U.S. can retain a peaceful and open Indo-Pacific order. After the bloody Napoleonic Wars, the European powers at the time Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Britain formed the Quadruple Alliance which came together to try and create a system revolving around an equilibrium of power where no single state could challenge the others without facing defeat. This coalition of status quo powers were committed to maintaining peace and order and preventing the emergence of disorder and war, a similar objective with regards to the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. Many people believe the peace following the Congress of Vienna resulted from your traditional balance of power theory, where strategic parity between the countries resulted in an equilibrium, thus creating the first real enduring peace in modern European history. I disagree, I believe peace was established and maintained not because of strategic parity, but rather the overwhelming strength of the Quadruple alliance whose combined power would overwhelm any would-be revisionist power trying to change the status quo. Similar to the United States and its allies in the late 20th century, no state in the Western Pacific was able to challenge the combined power of the status quo coalition (United States and its Allies), which resulted in peace because of an imbalance of power favoring the status quo coalition. The peace that stemmed from the Congress of Vienna remained up until that imbalance of power became more balanced with the unification of Germany in 1871. After Germany unified there was a real shift in the balance, similar to China's huge military build up in the Indo Pacific, which resulted in more parity between a would-be revisionist Germany and the rest of the Quadruple alliance. The emergence of a unified Germany was a prelude to war because for the first time since the Congress convened, a single power had the capabilities and strength to potentially change the status quo on its own. There was no longer an imbalance of power where the Quadruple Alliance had overwhelming capabilities and strength in comparison to any one state trying to revise the order, and instead a balance of power emerged between Germany and the rest of the Quadruple Alliance, creating disagreements about relative power, that reshaped the equilibrium in ways that made future great power war more likely. This situation is analogous to today. China's rapid military build up has resulted in a more level playing field via the United States and its allies, creating more parity which is leading to increased disagreements and constant provocations in the Indo-Pacific. Like Germany before World War One, China today may see this balance of capabilities as not representing the true balance of power, and may try to change that calculus through war.

American strategists must maintain common sense, and understand that the only way to deter China is to recreate an imbalance of power by pooling together allied capabilities in military power, economic power, and technological innovation to deter China from even thinking it has similar capabilities and strength in comparison to the status quo powers. Similar to what the U.S. and its NATO allies have in Europe, the strategic imbalance of power favoring NATO via Russia has deterred Russia from even contemplating an attack on NATO, because Russia would be met with devastating force. American strategists must understand that if Russia were to successfully invade and take Ukraine that imbalance would become more balanced resulting in more strategic parity between NATO and Russia, potentially resulting in Russia becoming more revisionist and aggressive. The U.S. will need to spend more on defense, while building a coalition of partners in the Indo-Pacific that collectively overwhelm China in all strategic areas necessary for great power competition and success. History shows when facing revisionist authoritarian powers, that order and peace depend on a coalition of status quo powers coming together and pooling their capabilities, resulting in significantly stronger military, economic, and technological potential, thereby creating an imbalance of power in the region, and one in which China would not dare try and disrupt. The moment is now for American strategists to recognize that parity will tempt revisionist powers to try and revise the power balance to their favor, which only an imbalance of power favoring the status quo coalition would deter. The peace in the Indo-Pacific does not depend on equality, but on overwhelming strength in the hands of the status quo powers.

— F.J.